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Introduction 
We live in a world of constant tweeting, social media posting, e-
mail checking, fact Googling, Netflix binging, swiping right, and online 
shopping. In fact, most Americans spend as much time online as a full-
time job; over forty hours are spent per week on their smartphones, 
desktops, laptops, and other streaming devices.1 And while many people 
 
1. On average, Americans spend 5.9 hours per day (or 41.3 hours per week) 
on their smartphones, desktops, laptops, and other streaming devices. Rob 
Marvin, Tech Addiction by the Numbers: How Much Time We Spend 
Online, PC Mag (June 11, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.pcmag.com/ 
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take the Internet for granted, as many as 26.5 million Americans with 
visual or auditory disabilities face difficulties accessing the websites of 
private businesses.2 Website accessibility for disabled persons has 
recently become a hotbed for litigation under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires certain businesses to comply 
with standards that allow disabled persons equal access to products and 
services. While businesses have clear guidance as to what those 
standards mean in the physical world, the ADA is silent on how, 
exactly, those standards translate to the digital world. In the absence 
of such clear standards, businesses are exposed to continuous liability 
for failure to comply with website accessibility. For businesses, those 
26.5 million Americans with visual and auditory disabilities translates 
to 26.5 million potential plaintiffs who could bring a website 
accessibility action against them.  
For a website to be accessible to an individual with a visual 
impairment, the website must be coded to integrate with the 
individual’s screen reader.3 Deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals rely on 
closed captioning coding for audio files.4 In theory, this seems like a 
simple enough task. But the implementation of the ADA into the digital 
world has been fraught with confusion. The practical reality of making  
article/361587/tech-addiction-by-the-numbers-how-much-time-we-spend-
online [https://perma.cc/JR3L-H4KU].  
2. Approximately 25.5 million adult Americans experience vision loss. Facts 
and Figures on Adults with Vision Loss, Am. Found. for the Blind, 
http://www.afb.org/info/blindness-statistics/adults/facts-and-figures/235 
[https://perma.cc/U7D9-GQMH] (last updated May 2018). The term 
“vision loss” encompasses a wide range of visual problems, from 
individuals who have trouble seeing even when using contact lenses or 
glasses, to individuals who are blind or unable to see at all. Id. 
Approximately one million Americans are functionally deaf. Ross E. 
Mitchell, How Many Deaf People Are There in the United States? 
Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 11 J. 
of Deaf Stud. and Deaf Educ. 112, 112 (2006). See Brief for National 
Federation of the Blind et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 8, 
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gil, No. 17-13467 (11th Cir. Dec. 20, 2017), 
2017 WL 6638243, at *8; see also Jonathan Lazar & Paul Jaeger, Reducing 
Barriers to Online Access for People with Disabilities, 27 Issues in Sci. 
and Tech. (2011), https://issues.org/lazar/ [https://perma.cc/YB7L-
BHQG].  
3. A blind or visually impaired individual relies on a software application, 
called a screen reader, to take the information presented on a website and 
translate it into usable format, such as braille versions of the text or 
computer-synthesized speech output. Brief for National Federation of the 
Blind et al., supra note 2, at *10–11. 
4. A deaf or hard-of-hearing individual relies on the website’s coding to show 
closed captioning on audio files. Without the proper coding, a website will 
not integrate with an individual’s software application or display closed-
captioning. Id. at *10–11. 
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websites accessible to those with visual and auditory impairments is a 
legal minefield with unarticulated accessibility standards, a circuit 
court split, and significant financial costs for businesses. 
When the ADA was passed in 1990, the Internet was in its infancy; 
Congress did not include regulatory guidance for websites as it did for 
physical structures.5 Websites are not mentioned anywhere in the ADA 
regulations and the Department of Justice (DOJ) has provided little 
guidance in this area of law. Now, plaintiff firms are storming the 
courtrooms in ever-increasing numbers to take advantage of the 
opportunity this gap in the current law presents.6 The number of 
website accessibility lawsuits hit at least 2,258 in 2018, a 177% increase 
from 814 such lawsuits in 2017.7 Without clear website accessibility 
standards in effect, this trend is unlikely to stop any time soon.8  
5. Since the ADA’s passage, the DOJ has consistently stated that the ADA’s 
accessibility requirements apply to websites belonging to private 
companies. See, e.g., Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) 
(statement of Rep. Canady, Chairman, Subcommittee on the 
Constitution) (“It is the opinion of the Department of Justice currently 
that the accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
already apply to private Internet Web sites and services.”); 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web 
Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and 
Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 43,465 (proposed July 26, 
2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35) (“The Department believes that 
title III reaches the Web sites of entities that provide goods or services 
that fall within the 12 categories of ‘public accommodations,’ as defined 
by the statute and regulations.”). 
6. Plaintiffs’ counsel have taken advantage of the lack of guidance from the 
DOJ to use the courts to develop this area of law. See Joshua Briones & 
Nicole Ozeran, INSIGHT: A Mid-Year Review of the Current State of 
ADA Website Accessibility Lawsuits, Bloomberg L. News (Aug. 16, 
2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-midyear-review-n73014481764/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N4HS-ZSD9]. In 2016, plaintiffs filed 240 federal ADA website 
compliance lawsuits. In 2017, plaintiffs filed 814 such lawsuits. ADA 
Website Compliance Lawsuits: Recent and High-Profile, LOVATA (Mar. 
5, 2018), https://lovata.com/blog/ada-website-compliance-lawsuits-recent-
and-high-profile.html [https://perma.cc/5KQK-Q5VA]. 
7. Minh N. Vu, Kristina M. Launey, & Susan Ryan, Number of Federal 
Website Accessibility Lawsuits Nearly Triple, Exceeding 2250 in 2018, 
ADA Title III News & Insights (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www. 
adatitleiii.com/2019/01/number-of-federal-website-accessibility-lawsuits-
nearly-triple-exceeding-2250-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/F5W9-9F7P]. 
Plaintiffs filed these federal claims in fourteen states, with New York 
leading the pack with 1,564 such lawsuits. Id. 
8. See Samuel D. Levy & Martin S. Krezalek, A Call for Regulation: The 
DOJ Ignored Website Accessibility Regulation and Enterprising Chaos 
Ensued, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 9, 2018, 2:35 PM), https://www.law.com/ 
newyorklawjournal/2018/11/09/a-call-for-regulation-the-doj-ignored-website-
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As the website accessibility debacle has landed in the laps of federal 
judges, courts are tasked with two main questions. First, does a website 
of an ADA-covered business qualify as a “place of public 
accommodation” within Title III of the ADA? Answering this question 
is tricky, especially when addressing web-only businesses without a 
traditional storefront or physical location. Circuit courts are split over 
whether a website needs a nexus to a physical structure to qualify as a 
place of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. 
If the ADA does apply to the website, the next question is: does 
the website violate the ADA? Despite millions of Americans—on both 
sides of the “v”—being affected by this question, the DOJ has failed to 
issue formal website accessibility standards.9 Because there is not one 
official source of website accessibility standards, businesses that operate 
nationally or across several states are left with inconsistent obligations 
piecemealed together from the different jurisdictions.10 
This Comment explores the tension between the burden that 
undefined website accessibility standards place on private businesses 
and the need for disabled Americans to have full access to websites. 
Part I provides an overview of Title III of the ADA and how Title III 
relates to website accessibility standards. Part II examines the circuit 
split on whether a plaintiff alleging a Title III violation on a website’s 
accessibility must demonstrate a nexus between the website and a 
physical location. Part III discusses the absence of clear website 
accessibility standards. Part IV explores the burden businesses face 
trying to comply with inconsistent standards, arguing that in light of 
 
accessibility-regulation-and-enterprising-chaos-ensued/ [https://perma.cc/ 
39PT-M2JP] (“Until the DOJ acts, the threat of surf-by lawsuits will 
continue to surge.”). 
9. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Legis. Aff., Office of the Ass’t Att’y 
Gen., Opinion Letter on Website Accessibility for Public Accommodations 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Sept. 25, 2018) (“[T]he 
Department is evaluating whether promulgating specific web accessibility 
standards through regulations is necessary and appropriate to ensure 
compliance with the ADA.”). 
10. Companies who operate nationwide face liability in some jurisdictions but 
not others depending upon where a potential plaintiff lives or in which 
court the claim is brought. The online streaming service Netflix serves as 
an example of this issue. In National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that 
Netflix’s website is a place of public accommodation under Title III 
despite no physical location existing for these services. 869 F. Supp. 2d 
196, 201–02 (D. Mass 2012). But in Cullen v. Netflix, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California held the opposite—
that Netflix’s website is not a place of public accommodation under Title 
III because it is solely a web-based service. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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the inconsistent standards across the country, businesses face an undue 
burden to attempt ADA compliance for their websites. 
I. Title III of the ADA and Website Accessibility 
A. ADA Background 
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”11 
Congress later amended the Act in 2008 to broaden the coverage for 
individuals protected by the law.12 
An individual with a disability alleging that a private business’s 
website is inaccessible would file suit under Title III of the ADA.13 To 
state a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that she is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that the defendant owns, 
leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) that the 
defendant discriminated against the individual by denying her a full 
and equal opportunity to enjoy the services or goods that the defendant 
provides.14 Under the ADA, a successful plaintiff cannot recover 
damages, but the plaintiff may recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees.”15 
Injunctive relief is also available if the discrimination includes “a failure 
to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are 
structural in nature, in existing facilities . . . where such removal is 
readily achievable.”16 
As a general rule, Title III requires “places of public 
accommodation,” or private businesses whose operations affect 
commerce, to provide individuals with disabilities equal access to and 
an equal opportunity to enjoy “goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
 
11. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 329 (1990) (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012)) (defining the intent of the ADA); see also 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, EEOC, https://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/ada.html [https://perma.cc/9XTA-MLRR] 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
12. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 3553. 
13. See, e.g., Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 872 (N.D. 
Ohio 2018) (“Castillo alleges that Jo-Ann has failed to make its website 
accessible to blind or visually impaired individuals and that such failure 
discriminates against her and other blind or visually impaired individuals 
in violation of Title III of the ADA.”); Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 
F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1316 ( S.D. Fla. 2017) (“The Plaintiff, Juan Carlos Gil, 
sued Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. . . . for injunctive relief under Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”). 
14. See, e.g., Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008).  
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a), 12205.  
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a)(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
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advantages, or accommodations.”17 Businesses covered by the ADA 
must employ fifteen or more individuals, be open to the public, and fall 
into at least one of the twelve broad categories enumerated in the ADA: 
hotels, restaurants, places of entertainment, public gathering locations, 
sales establishments, service establishments, public transportation 
locations, places of public display or collection, recreational facilities, 
educational facilities, social service centers, and exercise facilities.18 
Notably, Congress did not list “websites” in any of the categories in the 
original Act or in the subsequent 2008 amendment.19 
 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also Business Websites, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 
https://www.nad.org/resources/technology/internet-access-and-broadband/ 
business-websites/ [https://perma.cc/246T-BSQT] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2019). 
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1, 12111, 12181(7). 
19. Congress listed specific examples of the twelve categories:  
A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an 
establishment located within a building that contains not more 
than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by 
the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such 
proprietor; 
B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other 
place of exhibition or entertainment; 
D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place 
of public gathering; 
E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, 
shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; 
F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, 
travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office 
of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, 
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other 
service establishment; 
G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public 
transportation; 
H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or 
collection; 
I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or 
postgraduate private school, or other place of education; 
K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food 
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center 
establishment; and 
L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other 
place of exercise or recreation.  
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Congress defined discrimination in Title III as a “failure to take 
such steps” so a disabled individual is not treated differently than 
others or excluded because of the “absence of auxiliary aids and 
services.” 20 The business is exempt from compliance if the business can 
show that taking these steps would either “fundamentally alter” the 
nature of the “goods, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or 
accommodation” or result in an “undue burden.”21 
The ADA delegates authority for implementing regulations to the 
DOJ.22 Federal regulations explain that the ADA obligates public 
accommodations to communicate with customers who have visual or 
hearing impairments.23 Regulations also provide “examples” of 
“auxiliary aids and services” as a “screen reader software” and “other 
effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to 
individuals who are blind or have low vision.”24 
B. Businesses Victim to “Surf-By” Lawsuits Under Title III of the 
ADA 
Website accessibility lawsuits, dubbed “surf-by” lawsuits, have 
risen in recent years.25 But why? While the ADA does not allow 
plaintiffs to recover compensation, their attorneys  can.26 That financial 
 
 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
21. Id. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). 
23. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2018). 
24. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2). 
25. These lawsuits are similar to traditional “drive-by” ADA lawsuits, where 
disabled individuals only need to drive by an establishment to spot 
traditional accessibility issues (for instance, a ramp that is too steep). The 
individual can then sue the establishment without any warning or 
opportunity to cure the defect even if the individual never visited the 
business before. Surf-By Lawsuits: Is Your Company’s Website ADA 
Compliant?, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www. 
agg.com/Surf-By-Lawsuits-Is-Your-Companys-Website-ADA-Compliant-
08-08-2017/ [https://perma.cc/5M8M-DHDU]. 
26. The attorney fee provision in the ADA allows the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a “reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation 
expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2012). While this appears fair to 
both parties, courts usually grant the prevailing plaintiff, but rarely the 
prevailing defendant, fees. This imbalance gives plaintiffs a strong 
advantage in any ADA lawsuit and pushes the majority of cases to early 
settlement. Richard M. Hunt, Attorneys Fees in ADA and FHA Cases—
It’s Time for Fairness, Accessibility Defense (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://accessdefense.com/?p=595 [https://perma.cc/6KTR-GM8P]. Legal 
fees for ADA retaliation claims vary but may range from “$25,000 to 
astonishing digits.” ADA Website Compliance Lawsuits: Recent and High-
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motive encourages plaintiff firms to search for accessibility issues on 
businesses’ website by “surfing” the web. These surf-by lawsuits parrot 
the classic ADA “drive-by” lawsuits, where disabled individuals drive 
from business to business in search of minor ADA violations to sue over. 
Instead of a car, however, plaintiff firms here use their mouse to click 
from page to page in hopes of finding an inaccessible website. 
Not only are these website accessibility claims easy to identify, they 
are also easy to file. Most of these “surf-by” lawsuits include boilerplate 
complaints with cut-and-paste language. 27 These simple complaints cost 
the plaintiff firm minimal time and resources.28 Between a circuit court 
split and a hodgepodge of standards from different district courts across 
the country, many defendant companies try to settle out of court to 
keep litigation costs down.29 Ultimately, the costs of these lawsuits are 
passed on to consumers.30 
II. Circuit Split on Whether a Business’s Website 
Requires a Physical Location to Be a Place of Public 
Accommodation Under the ADA 
Federal circuits disagree on whether a plaintiff alleging a website 
compliance violation under Title III must demonstrate a nexus between 
the website and a physical location for the ADA to apply.31 Courts in 
 
Profile, LOVATA (Mar. 5, 2018), https://lovata.com/blog/ada-website-
compliance-lawsuits-recent-and-high-profile.html [https://perma.cc/5KQK- 
Q5VA]. If these claims are brought as a class action lawsuit, attorneys’ 
fees increase sharply due to the additional legal and administrative work 
required in these large, complex cases. Class action lawsuits drive fees “to 
go from what is often a few hundred or thousand dollars to millions.” 
Edward F. Harold, New Trend in Accessibility Lawsuits: The Class Action 
Complaint, Fisher Phillips Newsletter (July 2, 2018), https://www. 
fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-new-trend-in-accessibility-
lawsuits-the-class [https://perma.cc/LY9X-TD27] (explaining how one 
class action lawsuit against a national restaurant and retail chain over an 
inaccessible parking lot resulted in attorneys’ fees of $830,000); see also 
Denise Johnson, Why Claims Under Americans with Disabilities Act Are 
Rising, Insurance Journal (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal. 
com/news/national/2016/10/07/428774.htm [https://perma.cc/HQ8V-2AEJ] 
(explaining how settlement becomes a business decision as the “vast 
majority” of Title III lawsuits settle for less than what it would cost to 
file a motion to dismiss). 
27. Levy & Krezalek, supra note 8. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 877–78 (N.D. Ohio 
2018); see also Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1318–
20 (S.D. Fla. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-13467 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) 
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the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have held that the ADA may 
apply to a website “independent of any connection between the website 
and a physical place.”32 In contrast, courts in the Third, Sixth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have held that places of public accommodation 
covered by the ADA must: 1) be physical places; and 2) provide goods 
and services with a “sufficient nexus” to a physical location.33 The DOJ 
has hinted that the Supreme Court may need to answer the question of 
Title III’s application to non-physical establishments in the future.34  
(observing that the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have held that 
the ADA covers websites whether a physical locale exists or not, whereas 
the Third, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a complaint 
must allege a sufficient connection between a physical location and the 
website). 
32. Gil, 242 F. Supp. at 1318–19 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (citing, e.g., Morgan v. Joint 
Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Nat’l Fed’n of 
the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 575–76 (D. Vt. 2015); Nat’l 
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Mass. 
2012); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 393 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n 
of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life 
Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 
179 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999); cf. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods. Ltd., 
294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the plain language of 
Title III of the ADA covers both tangible, physical barriers as well as 
“intangible barriers” although the court did not address the specific issue 
of whether websites are public accommodations for purposes of the ADA). 
33. Gil, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1319, 1321 (citing Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 
695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015)); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 
614 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Accordingly, we do not find the term ‘public 
accommodation’ . . . to refer to non-physical access.”); Parker v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating “a public 
accommodation is a physical place”). The Fourth Circuit recently 
dismissed a case for lack of standing that raised this issue. See Griffin v. 
Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649, 657 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(“Standing doctrine will doubtless pose complicated questions as it is 
applied to Internet-based harms in the future, but the case before us today 
is straightforward and narrow . . . . Under these specific circumstances 
there can be no injury in fact.”). The Tenth Circuit has not addressed 
this issue. LaLonnie Gray, Are Websites Subject to the ADA?, 47 Colo. 
Law., Oct. 2018, at 42–43. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
concluded that Title III applies to “actual, physical places” in the context 
of vending machines, but has only addressed this issue as it applies to 
websites at the lower court level. See Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments 
USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 534–35 (5th Cir. 2016), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 
55 (2017); Zaid v. Smart Fin. Credit Union, No. H-18–1130, 2019 WL 
314732 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2019) (relying on Magee to hold that websites 
are not places of public accommodation). 
34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Magee v. Coca-Cola 
Refreshments USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–668) (“Several 
courts of appeals have disagreed about Title III’s application to non-
physical places offering goods or services . . . . [This case] does not 
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A. The Independent Perspective: First, Second, and Seventh Circuits 
Courts in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits interpret Title 
III’s language broadly and ask whether a business offers any goods or 
services to the public. If so, then the ADA would apply to the business’s 
website. Courts using this approach have concluded that Title III 
extends to purely online businesses without any connection to any 
physical structure.35 
Despite web-based services not existing when the ADA was passed 
in 1990, these courts point to three main reasons for their 
interpretation: legislative history, practicality, and Title III’s plain 
meaning. First, courts explain that the legislative history indicates the 
ADA should adapt to technological advances such as websites.36 Courts 
in these circuits point to Congress’s intent that all members of the 
public enjoy the same goods, services, privileges, and advantages 
irrespective of disability.37 Courts also highlight congressional reports 
that seemingly indicate that Congress did not intend to confine the 
ADA to the specific enumerated examples listed in each category of 
public accommodation.38 
 
implicate the question whether a Title III plaintiff must allege 
discrimination with a nexus to a physical location. . . . This case would 
therefore be an unsuitable vehicle for resolving the division over Title III’s 
application to goods or services without a nexus to a physical place.”). 
35. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 
(D. Mass. 2012) (“[E]xcluding businesses that sell services through the 
Internet from the ADA would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA.”) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 
1994)). 
36. Id. at 200–01 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 108 (1990), as 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381 (“[T]he Committee intends that 
the types of accommodation and services provided to individuals with 
disabilities, under all the titles of this bill, should keep pace with the 
rapidly changing technology of the times.”). 
37. Gil, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1319; see also Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Scribd 
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 573 (D. Vt. 2015) (construing the language of 
Title III “to effectuate its [remedial] purpose of providing a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
38. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 59 (1989)) 
(“[W]ithin each of these categories, the legislation only lists a few 
examples and then, in most cases, adds the phrase ‘other similar’ entities. 
The Committee intends that the ‘other similar’ terminology should be 
construed liberally consistent with the intent of the legislation . . . ”); 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 54 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 440, 494 (“A person alleging discrimination does not have 
to prove that the entity being charged with discrimination is similar to 
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Second, courts in these circuits have also taken a practical approach 
when examining the goal of the ADA. Given the “critical role” that the 
Internet occupies in Americans’ personal and professional lives, 
“excluding disabled persons from access to covered entities that use [the 
Internet] as their principal means of reaching the public would defeat 
the purpose of this important civil rights legislation.”39 
Third, these courts have concluded that the plain meaning of the 
text supports their broad interpretation.40 Because the Title III 
language states that it covers services “of” a public accommodation 
rather than services “at” or “in” a public accommodation,41 
establishments of public accommodation are not limited to actual 
physical structures.42 These courts have declared that differentiating 
between customers physically located in a store versus those located 
elsewhere—but purchasing the same services—would be absurd.43 
Because the statute’s plain language does not require physical 
structures for individuals to enter, courts cannot read that requirement 
into the statute.44 
B. The Nexus Perspective: Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
Federal courts in the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
interpret the Title III language more narrowly. These courts have 
concluded that places of public accommodation under the ADA must 
be physical structures because the statute’s twelve enumerated 
categories of public accommodations are all physical locations.45 Under  
the examples listed in the definition. Rather, the person must show that 
the entity falls within the overall category.”)). 
39. Scribd, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
40. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 
953 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“The statute applies to the services of a place of 
public accommodation, not services in a place of public accommodation. 
To limit the ADA to discrimination in the provision of services occurring 
on the premises of a public accommodation would contradict the plain 
language of the statute.”). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012). 
42. Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 
37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
43. Id. (“It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office 
to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase 
the same services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could 
not have intended such an absurd result.”). 
44. Id. 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Title III provides an 
extensive list of ‘public accommodations’ in § 12181(7) . . . . All the items 
on this list, however, have something in common. They are actual, 
physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places 
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the principle of noscitur a sociis, the term “place of public 
accommodation” must be interpreted within the context of the 
surrounding words.  Because the twelve enumerated categories of public 
accommodation are all physical locations, “some connection between 
the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is 
required.”46 As such, these courts require that websites have a sufficient 
connection to the physical place to fall under the ADA.47    
Under this approach, a business’s website violates Title III when it 
prevents an individual with a disability from “full and equal enjoyment” 
 
where the public gets those goods or services . . . . [T]his context suggests 
that some connection between the good or service complained of and an 
actual physical place is required.”); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 
F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (6th Cir. 1997) (“As is evident by § 12187(7), a public 
accommodation is a physical place and this Court has previously so 
held.”); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“The plain meaning of Title III is that a public accommodation is a 
place . . . . This is in keeping with the host of examples of public 
accommodations provided by the ADA, all of which refer to places.”); 
Peoples v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 387 F. App’x 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Our court is among those that have taken the position that the term 
[public accommodation] is limited to physical accommodations.”). 
46. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114. 
47. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Discrimination only exists if the discriminatory 
conduct has a ‘nexus’ to the goods and services of a physical location.”); 
Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding 
that the “inaccessibility of Domino’s website and app impede[d] access to 
the goods and services of its physical pizza franchises—which are places 
of public accommodation. . . . This nexus between Domino’s website and 
app and physical restaurants—which Domino’s does not contest—is 
critical to our analysis” and thus a nexus existed); Haynes v. Dunkin’ 
Donuts LLC, 741 F. App’x 752 (11th Cir. 2018) (declaring that Dunkin’ 
Donuts’s website could not discriminate because the website facilitated 
the use of Dunkin Donuts’s physical shops); Robles v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 
No. 2:16–cv–08211–ODW(SS), 2018 WL 566781, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 
2018) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that to successfully assert a Title III 
claim, ‘some connection between the good or service complained of and 
an actual physical place is required.’”) (citing Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114); 
Ford, 145 F.3d at 612 (“The plain meaning of Title III is that a public 
accommodation is a place . . . . This is in keeping with the host of 
examples of public accommodations provided by the ADA, all of which 
refer to places.”); Peoples, 387 F. App’x at 183 (“Our court is among 
those that have taken the position that the term [public accommodation] 
is limited to physical accommodations.”); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that Facebook was not 
a place of public accommodation and no nexus to a physical location 
existed). The Fifth Circuit has held that Title III applies to “actual, 
physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places 
where the public gets those goods or services.” Magee v. Coca-Cola 
Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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of the goods and/or services provided at that business’s physical 
location.48 But if a website does not prevent an individual from 
accessing goods and/or services available at the business’s physical 
location, then the website cannot violate Title III.49 Businesses with an 
exclusively online presence, therefore, do not fall under the ADA in 
these circuits and are essentially exempted from website accessibility 
compliance in these jurisdictions—at least for now.50 
III. The Absence of Website Accessibility Standards 
If Title III applies to a business’s website, the next question 
becomes: what website accessibility standards apply? The short answer 
is: none.51 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any U.S. Court of Appeal 
has answered this question.52 The DOJ, tasked with implementing ADA 
 
48. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954–56 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged their Title III 
claim when plaintiffs “alleged the inaccessibility of Target.com denie[d] 
the blind the ability to enjoy the services of Target stores”). 
49. See, e.g., Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (“Facebook operates only in 
cyberspace, and is thus not a ‘place of physical accommodation.’”); Gomez 
v. Bang & Olufsen Am., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-23801, 2017 WL 1957182, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (“All the ADA requires is that, if a retailer 
chooses to have a website, the website cannot impede a disabled person’s 
full use and enjoyment of the brick-and-mortar store . . . . Because 
Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant’s website impeded his personal 
use of [defendant’s] retail locations, his ADA claim must be dismissed.”). 
50. See Joshua Briones & Nicole V. Ozeran, INSIGHT: Ninth Circuit Delivers 
Bad News to Domino’s and ADA Website Accessibility Defendants, 
Bloomberg L. (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw. 
com/us-law-week/insight-ninth-circuit-delivers-bad-news-to-dominos-and-
ada-website-accessibility-defendants [https://perma.cc/UJ8L-RN9Q] 
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, 
LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019) “establishes a clear favorable rule for 
defendants who maintain an exclusively online presence” because the 
ADA would not apply). 
51. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. 16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017), rev’d and remanded, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, 
LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019). (“Indeed, the Court, after conducting 
a diligent search, has been unable to locate a single case in which a court 
has suggested, much less held, that persons and entities subject to Title 
III that have chosen to offer online access to their goods or services must 
do so in a manner that satisfies a particular WCAG conformance level.”). 
52. Levy & Krezalek, supra note 8. There is a case currently on appeal in the 
Eleventh Circuit which may address this question. See Gil v. Winn-Dixie 
Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2017), appeal docketed No. 
17-13467 (Aug. 1, 2017) (addressing whether the requested modifications 
to the defendant’s website are reasonable and readily achievable). 
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regulations,53 has declined as of the date this Comment was sent for 
publication to promulgate specific regulations on what accessibility 
means in the digital context. 
A. DOJ’s Failure to Address Website Accessibility Standards 
In July of 2010, the DOJ gave hope to the business community 
when it issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR).54 
The ANPR explained that the DOJ was considering making a revision 
to the regulations implementing Title III to establish requirements for 
websites to be accessible to individuals with disabilities.55 But the 
ANPR did not establish any regulations or guidelines; it merely 
articulated the DOJ’s desire to eliminate “remaining uncertainty 
regarding the applicability of the ADA to Web sites of entities covered 
by title III” and “make clear to entities covered by the ADA their 
obligations to make their Web sites accessible.”56 
Private companies waited patiently for the next seven years for the 
DOJ to take the next step and issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM). But the NPRM never came. The Trump Administration put 
the ANPR on its list of “inactive” regulations in the summer of 2017.57 
A few months later, the DOJ withdrew the ANPR, although it claimed 
it will “continue to assess whether specific technical standards are 
 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2012). 
54. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability: Accessibility of Web 
Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and 
Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460 (proposed July 26, 2010). 
55. Id.  
56. Id. at 43464. The ANPR covered the accessibility of websites for state 
and local government entities, covered under Title II, and public 
accommodations, under Title III. The DOJ subsequently bifurcated the 
rulemaking to address Title II and Title III separately. Nondiscrimination 
on the Basis of Disability; Notice of Withdrawal of Four Previously 
Announced Rulemaking Actions, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,932 (Dec. 26, 2017) (to 
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 36). 
57. 2017 Inactive Regulations, OIRA, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/ 
eAgenda/InactiveRINs_2017_Agenda_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z2UL-B5M3] (last visited Jan. 29, 2019); see also Minh N. Vu, DOJ 
Places Website Rulemaking on the “Inactive” List, ADA Title III News 
& Insights (July 21, 2017), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2017/07/doj-
places-website-rulemaking-on-the-inactive-list/ [https://perma.cc/KQ7K-
4T3B] (“Federal agencies typically provide public notice of the regulations 
that are under development twice a year in the Unified Regulatory 
Agenda. The first Agenda the Trump Administration issued, which went 
online July 20, 2017, contains some very noteworthy changes from the 
last such Agenda, issued by the Obama Administration . . . . The Agenda 
places the Department of Justice’s rulemakings under Titles II and III of 
the ADA for websites . . . on this 2017 Inactive Actions list, with no 
further information.”). 
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necessary and appropriate to assist covered entities in complying with 
the ADA.”58 
In June 2018, over one hundred bipartisan House members signed 
a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions asking for clarification on 
website accessibility standards under the ADA.59 The letter noted that 
the “absence of statutory, regulatory, or other controlling language on 
this issue” has fueled the rise of website accessibility lawsuits.60 The 
letter urged the DOJ to declare that these lawsuits are unfair and 
violate due process without clear statutory authority.61 The letter also 
requested a final ruling establishing website accessibility standards.62 
Six senators sent a similar letter to the DOJ in September 2018 asking 
for clarification on website accessibility standards for businesses.63 
On September 25, 2018, the DOJ declined to respond to these 
requests. The DOJ punted the question back to Congress, “[g]iven 
Congress’ ability to provide greater clarity through the legislative 
process.”64 The DOJ explained that it withdrew the ANPR because “the 
Department is evaluating whether promulgating specific web 
accessibility standards through regulations is necessary and appropriate 
to ensure compliance with the ADA.”65 
However, the DOJ did provide some guidance for businesses. The 
DOJ explained that the “absence of a specific regulation” does not 
justify noncompliance with a statute’s requirements.66 In other words, 
 
58. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Notice of Withdrawal of 
Four Previously Announced Rulemaking Actions, 82 Fed. Reg. at 60,932. 
59. Letter from Members of Congress to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States, DOJ (June 20, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/121/2018/06/ADA-Final-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6HHK-MSJN]. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Levy & Krezalek, supra note 8; Letter from U.S. Senators Charles E. 
Grassley, M. Michael Rounds, Thom Tillis, Mike Crapo, John Cornyn, 
and Joni K. Ernst to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of the United States, DOJ 
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-
10-04%20Grassley,%20Rounds,%20Tillis,%20Crapo,%20Cornyn,%20Ernst% 
20to%20Justice%20Dept.%20-%20ADA%20Website%20Accessibility.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4YX-FKZP] [hereinafter Letter from Senators to DOJ] 
(explaining that “for the ADA to be effective, it must be clear so that law 
abiding Americans can faithfully follow the law”). 
64. Letter from DOJ to Rep. Ted Budd (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii. 
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/121/2018/10/DOJ-letter-to-congress.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C65Z-DM7P] [hereinafter Letter from DOJ]. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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just because the DOJ has not issued a rule on this matter does not 
excuse a private business’s noncompliance with the “ADA’s general 
requirements of nondiscrimination and effective communication.”67 But 
without “the adoption of specific technical requirements for websites 
through rulemaking,” public accommodations have flexibility when 
determining how to comply with the ADA.68 Therefore, a business’s 
decision not to adopt a voluntary technical standard for website 
accessibility, such as the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 
(WCAG), does not mean the business violated the ADA; businesses 
may decide how to make their websites comply with the ADA.69 WCAG 
guidelines often appear in Title III website accessibility litigation and 
settlement documents. WCAG guidelines are private industry 
standards developed by the technology and accessibility experts from 
the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI).70 The WCAG set forth 
technical requirements of how to make a website accessible to people 
with a variety of disabilities.71 Three versions currently exist: 1.0, 2.0, 
and 2.1.72 Within each version, subsets of requirements further refine 
accessibility standards that represent different levels of accessibility 
within the overarching guideline. For example, WCAG 2.0 has three 
different compliance levels: A, AA, and AAA.73 Level A is the most 
basic while level AAA is the most comprehensive.74 
B. Website Accessibility Standards Issued by Courts 
For several years, the DOJ has required, in consent decrees and 
settlement agreements, that entities covered by the ADA comply with 
WCAG 2.0 level AA standards.75 But the DOJ has not explained how  
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Letter from DOJ, supra note 64. 
70. See generally Web Accessibility Initiative, W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SSS-AAL6] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) 
71. Id. 
72. The WAI published its latest update to its Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines 2.1 on June 5, 2018. W3C, Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, W3C Recommendation, https://www.w3.org/TR/ 
WCAG21/ [https://perma.cc/3224-7PTQ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
73. W3C, How to Meet WCAG 2.0 (Quick Reference), Web Accessibility 
Initiative, https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG21/quickref/ [https://perma. 
cc/AJV3-NH8K] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) [hereinafter W3C, How to 
Meet WCAG 2.0]. 
74. Id. 
75. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 902 n.1 (9th Cir. 2019); 
see, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America 
and Teachers Test Prep under the ADA, DJ 202-11-346, at ¶ 9 (c) (June 
18, 2018), https://www.ada.gov/ttp_sa.html [https://perma.cc/TYE7-
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businesses can show their plan to remain compliant to moot future 
lawsuits post-remediation.76 In private litigation over this matter, courts 
are still working to develop website accessibility standards. 
At least one court has recognized that DOJ guidance would be 
helpful rather than attempting to create the appropriate level of 
standard ad hoc.77 Despite the lack of federal regulatory guidance, some 
courts have ordered injunctive relief for defendants to comply with 
specific website accessibility standards.78 Courts appear to favor the 
 
5EH5] (mandating the defendant’s captions comply with Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 AA Guideline under the terms of 
the settlement); see, e.g., Consent Decree, Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. HRB 
Digital LLC and HRB Tax Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-10799-GAO, 2014 
WL 4999221, at ¶ 12 (a) (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 2014) (agreeing that 
defendants would “ensure that www.hrblock.com and the Online Tax 
Preparation Product conform to, at minimum, the Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 Level A and AA Success Criteria (‘WCAG 
2.0AA’)”; Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America 
and Ahold U.S.A., Inc. and Peapod, LLC, DJ 202-63-169, at 16 (Nov. 14, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/163956/download [https://perma.cc/ 
P78E-7KUS]; Consent Decree, United States v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
No. 16-67-RGA (D. De. Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.ada.gov/greyhound/ 
greyhound_cd.html [https://perma.cc/RD97-LZJF]. 
76. Letter from DOJ, supra note 64. 
77. See Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL 
5186354, at *9 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017) (“Uniform regulation in this area 
would, of course, be preferable to the case-by-case approach required by 
its absence.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
78. See Hindel v. Husted, No. 2-15-cv-3061, 2017 WL 432839, at *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Feb. 1, 2017) (ordering the Ohio Secretary of State to make his 
website conform with the WCAG 2.0 Level A and AA Success Criteria); 
Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 365, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 
2017) (approving a settlement that the defendant brings its website(s) 
into “substantial conformance” with WCAG 2.0 AA, “which are hereby 
determined by the court to be an appropriate standard to judge whether 
Defendant is in compliance with any accessibility requirements of the 
ADA”). But other courts have deferred imposing any specific website 
accessibility standards onto defendants while at the motion to dismiss 
stage of litigation. See, e.g., Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. CV 
17-1131-JFW(SKx), 2017 WL 2957736, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017) 
(noting in its denial of defendant Hobby Lobby’s motion to dismiss that 
“Hobby Lobby will have ample opportunity to present evidence of an 
appropriate remedy” if plaintiff wins, and “[w]hen crafting a remedy, the 
Court will consider carefully what level of accessibility applies to Hobby 
Lobby’s website”) (internal quotes and citations omitted); Access Now, 
Inc., 2017 WL 5186354, at *11 (“[The Court] will, if necessary, take up 
the question of the appropriate scope of the plaintiffs’ proposed injunction 
[imposing WCAG 2.0 AA guidelines on Blue Apron’s website] and 
whether it imposes an undue burden on Blue Apron . . . at the 
appropriate juncture.”). 
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WCAG 2.0 level AA.79  In June 2017, a Florida federal district court 
judge heard the first trial of an inaccessible website claim under Title 
III of the ADA.80 In Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,81 blind plaintiff 
Juan Carlos Gil alleged that the grocer’s website was inaccessible to 
visually impaired customers.82 As a result, Gil could not download 
coupons, order prescriptions online, or find store locations.83 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the judge ordered the grocery 
and pharmacy chain store to conform to the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines.84 
The injunction did not specify, however, which level of WCAG 
Guideline to implement (level A, AA, or AAA).85 The DOJ has not 
determined which level of compliance may be required under Title III, 
leaving courts to decide which, if any, level to apply.86 Likewise, no 
court has indicated which WCAG level would constitute sufficient 
accessibility under Title III as of the time this Comment was sent for 
publication.87  
79. See, e.g., Levy & Krezalek, supra note 8 (“Neither the U.S. Supreme 
Court nor any U.S. Court of Appeal has addressed what constitutes ADA 
minimum ‘accessibility,’ nor has any court endorsed any standard other 
than acknowledging that WCAG 2.0 AA has emerged as a de facto 
standard.”); Gomez v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1379 
n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (“While declining to rule on this explicitly at this 
point, the Court finds highly persuasive the number of cases adopting 
WCAG 2.0 Success Level AA as the appropriate standard to measure 
accessibility.”). 
80. Minh N. Vu, First Federal Court Rules that Having an Inaccessible 
Website Violates Title III of the ADA, ADA Title III News & Insights 
(June 13, 2017), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2017/06/first-federal-court-
rules-that-having-an-inaccessible-website-violates-title-iii-of-the-ada/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2AYW-NLNK]. 
81. 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2017). 
82. Id. at 1342. 
83. Id. at 1344–45. 
84. Id. at 1350 (“Remediation measures in conformity with the WCAG 2.0 
Guidelines will provide Gil and other visually impaired consumers the 
ability to access Winn-Dixie’s website and permit full and equal enjoyment 
of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations 
provided through Winn-Dixie’s website.”); see supra notes 70–74 and 
accompanying text. 
85. Id. at 1350–51. 
86. As the Letter from DOJ states, these guidelines are non-mandatory for 
private businesses. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; 
Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local 
Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 
43,465 (proposed July 26, 2010) (searching for feedback on what WCAG 
level the DOJ should adopt).  
87. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. 16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017) rev’d and remanded, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, 
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A few months after Winn-Dixie, the Eastern District of New York 
heard a similar lawsuit by a blind person, Victor Andrews, who alleged 
that the website of Blick Art Materials was incompatible with his screen 
reader technology. As a result, Andrews could not access the company’s 
website, which sells art supplies.88 Andrews moved to withdraw the class 
action allegations initially raised, and both parties sought approval of 
a settlement agreement.89 
The court approved the settlement terms, which included making 
the defendant’s website conform with the WCAG 2.0 Level AA 
guidelines.90 The settlement also stated that the WCAG 2.0 Level AA 
guidelines were “determined by the court to be an appropriate standard 
to judge whether Defendant is in compliance with any accessibility 
requirements of the ADA. . . .”91 The settlement terms did leave the 
door open to modify these accessibility standards if the DOJ 
promulgated a final ADA Title III regulation on website accessibility 
standards in the future.92 
IV. Businesses Face Unfair Burden to Comply with 
Unknown Website Accessibility Standards 
Defendants have been largely unsuccessful in getting surf-by 
lawsuits dismissed at the pleadings stage when the court finds that the 
website qualifies as a place of public accommodation.93 Thus far, 
defendants’ due process and primary jurisdiction arguments have 
largely failed.94 For this reason, businesses defending themselves in these  
LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Court . . . has been unable to 
locate a single case in which a court has suggested, much less 
held, . . . that persons and entities subject to Title III that have chosen 
to offer online access to their goods and services must . . . satisf[y] a 
particular WCAG conformance level.”). 
88. Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 365, 368–69 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
89. Id. at 369. 
90. Id. at 370. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., supra notes 31–34.  
94. See, e.g., Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(reversing the district court’s dismissal on due process grounds and 
remanding back to the district court); Reed v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 
327 F. Supp. 3d 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss by holding that no violation of due process occurred and declining 
to apply primary jurisdiction abstention); Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC, 
286 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss because injunctive relief sought by customer did not violate the 
defendant’s due process rights). The due process argument, however, may 
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lawsuits should focus their defense on the “undue burden” exception to 
ADA compliance. 95 Under the ADA, undue burden means “significant 
difficulty or expense.”96 
Because businesses do not have a clear, achievable metric against 
which to measure accessibility success, it is impossible for businesses to 
know if and when their websites have achieved sufficient accessibility 
under the ADA. This creates significant difficulty for businesses. 
 
rise again. On March 4, 2019, Domino’s Pizza requested a sixty-day 
extension of time to file its petition for certiorari. Justice Kagan granted 
the request. As of the time this Comment was sent for publication, the 
petition was due June 14, 2019. Application for an Extension of Time 
within which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, 
LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Minh N. Vu, ADA Title III 
News & Insights, Domino’s to Ask Supreme Court to Consider Whether 
ADA Website/Mobile App Accessibility Lawsuits Violate Due Process, 
(Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.adatitleiii.com/2019/03/dominos-to-ask-supreme-
court-to-consider-whether-ada-website-mobile-app-accessibility-lawsuits-violate-
due-process/ [https://perma.cc/2NYN-DWAH] (predicting Domino’s Pizza 
will petition the Supreme Court for certiorari). 
95. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a) (2016). Businesses largely have not raised this 
defense. See, e.g., Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 
1350 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (“Winn-Dixie has presented no evidence to establish 
that it would be unduly burdensome to make its website accessible to 
visually impaired individuals. To the contrary, its corporate 
representative unequivocally testified that modifying the website to make 
it accessible to the visual impaired was feasible.”). This is possibly because 
so few of these cases have gone to trial. See supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
96. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2012). 
In determining whether an action would result in an undue 
burden, factors to be considered include[—]  
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; 
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in 
the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect 
on expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are 
necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; 
or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the 
site; 
(3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal 
relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent 
corporation or entity; 
(4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent 
corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or 
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, 
type, and location of its facilities; and 
(5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent 
corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and 
functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity. 
 Id. 
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Additionally, plaintiffs can always “move the target”— while one 
plaintiff could ask for WCAG 2.0 Level AA compliance, the next could 
seek Level AAA, or WCAG 2.1 compliance. Likewise, a private interest 
group could issue another more exacting technical standard for new 
technology that has yet to be even fathomed by the court system. While 
businesses are left chasing the moving target of accessibility, they run 
the risk of financial ruin. This creates an undue burden.  
A.  Unknown Financial Costs to Implement Accessibility Features 
Businesses regulated by the ADA face a significant financial cost to 
code their websites for screen reader technology both upfront and on 
an ongoing basis. Unfortunately, reliable data on the actual cost of 
implementing and maintaining website accessibility is scarce. A 
regulatory impact analysis from 2011 found that, for example, making 
an air travel website WCAG 2.0 compliant ranged from “$31,200 for 
very small sites to $225,000 for larger sites.”97 
The recent Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. case also provides some 
evidence about the potential cost of updating a company’s website.98 In 
Winn-Dixie, a website accessibility expert testified that an initial audit 
of the grocery chain’s website would take three weeks and cost between 
$9,000 and $11,000.99 Fixing the identified problems would then cost 
between $16,000 and $20,000.100 Then a second audit would follow at 
the tune of an additional $4,000 to $6,000.101 All in all, the “ballpark 
estimate” to repair the accessibility issues totaled around $37,000, 
although this was just a best guess until the audit actually began and 
issues could be identified;102 Winn-Dixie set aside $250,000 for the 
repair.103 
 
97. Thomas B. Alleman, Bank Websites Attract ADA Claims: A Survey of 
the Issues, Bloomberg (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.bna.com/bank-
websites-attract-n73014447888/ [https://perma.cc/F2YM-6QXM]. 
98. 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1346–47. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1347 (“After identifying the problems through the audit, it would 
take 80 to 100 hours at a billable rate of $200 per hour or $16,000 to 
$20,000.”). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1345–47. The Court was unsympathetic to the financial burden 
implementing the accessibility changes placed on the defendant, stating 
that “whether the cost to modify the website is $250,000 or $37,000 is of 
no moment.” Id. at 1347. The court justified the potential quarter-million 
price tag because it “pale[d] in comparison to the $2 million Winn-Dixie 
spent in 2015 to open the website and the $7 million it spent in 2016 to 
remake the website for the [rewards] program.” Id. 
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What courts may not realize is that the costs do not stop just 
because the website is coded initially for accessibility. Every time a new 
photo, link, or page is added, additional coding is required.104 Many 
business owners retain “digital accessibility consultants” to routinely 
audit website content and code.105 Annual maintenance costs range from 
$4,800 to $23,400 per site, but these figures may not capture all the 
incremental costs of compliance.106 Unlike making a structural fix, like 
a ramp, to allow accessibility, digital website compliance is an ongoing 
concern for businesses. 
Without knowing which website accessibility standard is required 
for a website to be deemed “accessible” under the ADA, companies 
cannot know how much money to budget to absorb these compliance 
costs.107 Under the WCAG, for example, there are three separate levels 
of accessibility standards for the 2.0 requirement: A, AA, AAA.108 More 
advanced levels, such as the AAA standard, include more accessibility 
features than the lower levels.109 These more thorough accessibility 
 
104. Levy & Krezalek, supra note 8 (“Ensuring screen reader availability is 
fraught with technical challenges and high costs, leaving many businesses 
unable to launch new pages due to fear of being sued for noncompliance.”). 
105. Id. 
106. Alleman, supra note 97. 
107. There is also a question over whether alternative accessibility methods, 
such as a telephone number that disabled individuals could call rather 
than use the business’s website, could satisfy the ADA’s accessibility 
requirements for websites. The DOJ has explained that “covered entities 
with inaccessible Web sites may comply with the ADA’s requirement for 
access by providing an accessible alternative, such as a staffed telephone 
line, for individuals to access the information, goods, and services of their 
Web site.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability: Accessibility of 
Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities 
and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (proposed July 26, 
2010). But courts seem dubious of this alternative without robust evidence 
of the telephone number’s effectiveness. See, e.g., Gorecki v. Dave & 
Buster’s, Inc., CV 17-1138 PSG (AGRx), 2017 WL 6371367, at *1, 6 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 10, 2017) (denying summary judgment in favor of Dave & 
Buster’s “[b]ased on the scant evidence presented” on whether its website 
“guarantees ‘full and equal enjoyment’” of the company’s services despite 
the website having an “accessibility banner” that directs screen readers to 
a telephone number); Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 903 
n.4 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[The Court] believe[s] that the mere presence of the 
phone number, without discovery on its effectiveness, is insufficient to 
grant summary judgment in favor of Domino’s.”). 
108. W3C, How to Meet WCAG 2.0, supra note 73. 
109. See, e.g., Ben Caldwell et al., Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 
(WCAG) 2.0, W3C (Dec. 11, 2008), https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/ 
[https://perma.cc/LQ6M-2QAF] (outlining the different accessibility 
standards for levels A, AA, and AAA). 
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standards likely cost more money to implement and maintain compared 
to lower standards. 
As technology develops, the definition of compliance will likely 
evolve as well. The WAI updated the WCAG 2.0 standard in June 2018 
and published the WCAG 2.1 standard, which extends website 
accessibility to mobile devices.110 As businesses attempt to keep pace 
with ever-evolving technology, the burden of maintaining compliance 
only continues to grow. 
This financial burden falls more heavily on smaller businesses, 
which are less likely to have the financial reserves necessary for a 
website overhaul and continuing maintenance issues. And while larger 
companies may have in-house technology departments who can assist 
with the day-to-day managing of website accessibility requirements, 
small businesses often lack such internal resources. This would leave 
small businesses to contract with outside digital accessibility 
consultants on a permanent basis, incurring long-term costs. 
Opponents may argue that these costs are ultimately passed to the 
consumer, so the business does not really shoulder the financial burden 
of website compliance. Or, they may argue that website compliance is 
merely the cost of doing business in the digital era or that these costs 
are largely unknown, so they cannot present an undue burden to 
businesses. But businesses need more certainty of what ADA 
compliance will cost so they may budget accordingly. Without knowing 
the required standard, however, getting a true estimate of cost is very 
difficult. As website accessibility standards remain unclear and 
unarticulated, businesses cannot plan for the true cost of what 
compliance is now or in the future. This leaves private companies on 
dubious financial ground. 
B. Businesses Open to Liability Even if Currently Trying to Remediate 
Businesses may try to pre-emptively conform to some version of the 
WCAG guidelines to prevent being sued over their websites’ 
accessibility under the ADA. Even if a company is trying to comply 
with the fuzzy website accessibility technical standards, however, that 
good faith effort may not be enough to preclude a lawsuit, even if one 
has already been filed against the company for the same issue. 
In Haynes v. Hooters of America,111 the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s 
 
110. Although the W3C notes the “publication of WCAG 2.1 does not 
deprecate or supersede WCAG 2.0,” it also “advises the use of WCAG 2.1 
to maximize future applicability of accessibility efforts.” See Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, W3C (June 5, 2018), https://www. 
w3.org/TR/WCAG21/ [https://perma.cc/Z49Q-8WN5]. 
111. 893 F.3d 781 (11th Cir. 2018).  
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decision to dismiss a lawsuit against Hooters for mootness.112 The blind 
plaintiff filed suit against Hooters in April 2017, alleging that Hooters’ 
website was not accessible with his screen reader software.113 But in 
August 2016, a different plaintiff had already filed a separate, yet 
almost identical, lawsuit against Hooters.114 Less than three weeks later, 
the parties reached a settlement agreement and closed the case.115 As 
part of the settlement, Hooters agreed to bring its website accessibility 
in line with the WCAG 2.0 standards by September 29, 2018.116 
Despite Hooters having already activated a remediation plan for its 
website, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Haynes 
case was not moot for three main reasons.117 First, Hooters had not 
finished making its website accessible with screen reader technology. 
Second, a “live controversy” still existed over whether Haynes would 
receive an injunction to force Hooters to make its website ADA-
compliant. Third, because Haynes was not a party to the earlier 
settlement agreement, Haynes would have no remedy against Hooters 
if Hooters failed to remediate its website.118 Plaintiffs will likely look to 
this case to justify why a business should remain open to liability even 
if that company is in the process of remediation. 
Ongoing potential liability places an undue burden on companies 
due to the significant expense it creates. The Haynes decision leaves 
businesses exposed to continual liability while in the process of website 
remediation. This means that companies can be forced to hire legal 
counsel to defend themselves against separate, yet in all substantive 
matters identical, lawsuits while it is bringing its website into 
compliance. 
This repeat liability can spell enormous expense for companies and 
may be ruinous for both large and small businesses if hit with multiple 
lawsuits during remediation. Companies would be struck with multiple 
fees at the same time. First, companies would have to pay their digital 
accessibility consultants for the implementation of website accessibility 
technology (and maintenance costs going forward). Second, these 
organizations would incur significant legal costs to defend website 
accessibility lawsuits filed against them before finalizing accessibility. 
 
112. Id. at 785. 
113. Id. at 782–83. 
114. Id. at 783; see also Gomez v. Hooters of Am., LLC, No. 1:16-CV-23608-
CMA (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2016). 
115. Haynes, 893 F.3d at 783.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 784. 
118. Id. 
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And to add insult to injury, the courts have discretion to order 
defendants to pay the prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.119 
Conclusion 
Without an issued regulation from the DOJ on website accessibility 
standards, businesses are left to struggle on their own with how to make 
their websites ADA compliant. If the DOJ would promulgate one clear 
website accessibility technical standard, then businesses could divert 
their resources towards true compliance. It would allow businesses to 
invest meaningfully in serving their disabled customers, rather than 
paying money to plaintiff firms that do not have the interests of this 
disenfranchised community at heart. 
If businesses knew what standard they needed to implement, then 
they could budget for that cost. Businesses also know that they stand 
to gain financially if they make their websites more accessible to the 
disabled community. They miss out on a potential customer segment—
one with about $645 billion in disposable income annually—when their 
websites cannot be utilized by this population.120 Until a standard is 
promulgated, however, companies—especially small businesses and 
traditional “mom and pop” establishments—are at risk of making an 
investment that may later turn out to be insufficient and a waste of 
time and money. 
Private companies cannot be expected to make sense of the myriad 
of legal frameworks and technical jargon defining Title III’s website 
accessibility as it currently stands. Voluntary technical guidelines are 
highly complex with dozens of requirements.121 Courts require different 
accessibility standards, or none at all.122 And the DOJ has all but 
washed its hands of this issue.123  
The DOJ recognizes how difficult the website accessibility standard 
question is.124 To date, however, the DOJ has failed to put the ADA’s 
 
119. Under the ADA, prevailing plaintiffs may recover reasonable attorney 
fees. Supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12188(a), 12205, 2000(a)-3(b) (2012). 
120. This figure is an approximation based upon the data that approximately 
20 percent of the U.S. population has some form of disability. Web 
Accessibility Lawsuits: What’s the Current Landscape?, Essential 
Accessibility (July 27, 2018), https://www.essentialaccessibility.com/ 
blog/web-accessibility-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/B8YK-RFRD]. 
121. Supra notes 72–74. 
122. Supra notes 86–87. 
123. Supra notes 54–63. 
124. In its ANPR, the DOJ stated that it sought “input from experts in the 
field of computer science, programming, networking, assistive technology, 
and other related fields” to address the “complexity” that this legal area 
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website accessibility puzzle together into a package that businesses can 
follow. This lack of action leaves the website accessibility puzzle broken 
and incomplete at the feet of private businesses. Why should America’s 
businesses be forced to put together this puzzle without a clear picture 
of what it should look like in the end?  
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